No grand strategic doubts

Every so often, someone - usually from a Western think tank or
publication - comes along and asserts that India lacks a grand
strategy because it lacks a "strategic culture". Last week, it was The
Economist's turn to rehash the same old arguments and trigger a new
but familiar round of self-flagellation.

Don't you find it strange that a civilisation that has survived
several millennia of contact, invasions, colonisation and economic
exchanges with its core values intact is considered lacking a grand
strategy? Don't you find it strange the Indian Republic acquired and
maintained its unity, its pluralism, its democratic polity, in the
face of unprecedented challenges, without a "strategic culture"?

Well, I do.

If the benchmark for grand strategy is Alexandrian expansionism, then
yes, India fails the test. If, however, we look for an answer without
Western prejudices of what grand strategy ought to be, we will find it
in front of our noses: it lies in the pursuit of national unity.

The central preoccupation of India's rulers - from the Mauryas to
Mughals, from the British Raj to the government of the Indian Republic
- has been to unite the nation under one rule. This is our grand
strategy. Our "strategic culture" is centred around this.

The Arthashastra enjoins the king to become the master of the
subcontinent by various methods. But culture places limits on
conquest. Arrian of Nicomedia, a second-century Greek historian,
states that Indian kings refrained from attempting to conquer lands
beyond the subcontinent because that was considered adharma.

While it might disappoint the Alexandrians among us, it is perfectly
honourable to have an internally-focused grand strategy. There is no
reason why only territorial or hegemonic ambition should qualify. The
subcontinent is neither small in size nor the people dwelling in it
few in number; so forging unity is not a simple task. In fact, uniting
and governing a highly diverse nation such as ours is one of the
toughest tests of statecraft. It should not be surprising that the
energies of India's rulers are expended on this task.

Therefore, instead of trying to measure up to Western standards of
what grand strategy ought to be, it is far more important to analyse
what India needs to do to strengthen national unity in the current
day.

Focusing on the internal tends to diminish attention to the external.
The twentieth-century diplomat and historian, K M Panikkar argued that
a "sense of isolation and refusal to see itself in relation to the
states outside the geographical limits of the subcontinent" has
historically been India's weakness. Inattention to the situation
across the Hindu Kush meant that the enemy had to be fought on the
plains of Panipat. Both colonisation and Partition were, in part, due
to the failure of India's leaders to take an interest in politics
beyond our shores. The lesson for us is that India must shape the
global balance of power in ways and towards purposes that strengthen
its own unity.

In a world where people, capital and ideas can move around relatively
easily, nations are defined by success. Everyone wants to part of a
successful nation; flights out of failed nations are often full.
National success is built on the back of prosperity. In other words,
India's unity will come under threat if it is not prosperous. Creating
prosperity is in the domain of domestic policy, but protecting it is a
task of foreign and defence policy.

The experience of the last century has created a mindset in our
establishment that sees the world from a foxhole, defending a weak
India against a hostile external world. We need one that thinks in
terms of promoting the interests of a stronger India in a world where
there are both opportunities and threats.

All of these, essentially, suggest that New Delhi must project power
internationally for the simple, old reason of ensuring our survival as
a united nation. For the next few decades, we will witness a
geopolitical contest between a reigning superpower and its principal
challenger. India shares a number of common interests with the United
States, while Kautilyan logic suggests a structurally adversarial
relationship with China. Even so, India is best off not choosing sides
at this time. It is better off swinging between the two, enjoying
better relations with each of them than they have with each other.

However, those looking for the government to promulgate and implement
a grand strategic blueprint fail to understand that such a thing is
not part of our political culture. It is unlikely that New Delhi will
articulate an official grand strategy. It is, after all, too busy
keeping the nation together.


The writer is director of the Takshashila Institution, an independent
public policy think tank
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